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TESTING THE COURT: DECISION-MAKING UNDER
THE MICROSCOPE
Nancy Scherer*
RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS
(2012). Pp. 192. Paperback $ 29.95.
RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, & JUSTIN WEDEKING, ORAL ARGUMENTS
COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE
(2012). Pp. 160. Hardcover $ 60.00.
AND

PAM CORLEY, AMY STEIGERWALT, & ARTEMUS WARD, THE PUZZLE OF UNANIMITY:
CONSENSUS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2013). Pp. 216. Hardcover $ 50.00.
For decades there has been a debate among political scholars of law and courts as to
what drives Supreme Court decision-making. The predominant paradigm is the attitudinal
model; it holds that each justice votes in accordance with her personal policy preferences
and the facts of the case.1 This is possible because members of the Court have no higher
office to achieve, nor do they stand for election. 2 For strict attitudinalists, nothing else
comes into the decision-making process. As Segal and Spaeth state, “the attitudinal model
is a complete and adequate model of the Supreme Court’s decisions on the merits.” 3 They
even go on to criticize the conviction that law matters in the Court’s decision-making as
“fatuousness characteristic of Pollyanna.” 4
In the wake of Segal and Spaeth’s ground-breaking research, other political scientists began to question whether the attitudinal model was enough to fully explain why
justices vote the way they do.5 Critically, none of these scholars questioned the basic principle of the attitudinal model, but believed that, under certain circumstances, there was
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Wellesley College.
1. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65
(1993).
2. Id. at 69.
3. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Authors Respond, 4 LAW AND COURTS 11 (1994).
4. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 1 (2002).
5. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Legal Regimes and Doctrines in Supreme Court Decision Making
(Oct. 1998), available at http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/research/supcourt/spsa1998.htm (“The unabashed
nature of the claims for the attitudinal model leaves many political scientists (to say nothing of many, if not most,
legal academics, political leaders, and attentive citizens) very troubled.”). See also Mark J. Richards & Herbert
M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision-Making, 96 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REVIEW 305
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more to explain judicial behavior beyond personal policy preferences. For example, Epstein and Knight demonstrated that, in certain cases, justices vote strategically. 6 Examining
the notes taken by several members of the Court, they discovered evidence that justices
forego their true policy preferences when they learn in post-argument conferences that
they do not have the five votes to prevail on the merits. Under these circumstances, justices
compromise with more moderate justices, and agree to sign onto an opinion stating their
second policy preference, rather than seeing no majority form at all, or worse, that their
least favored preference becomes the law of the land. 7
Another major contribution to the literature on Supreme Court voting behavior is the
theory that justices take into consideration institutional norms or contexts when deciding
how to vote.8 People ascribing to this belief are often referred to as “new-institutionalists.”9
Here, scholars argue that rather than focusing solely on individual justices’ behavior, we
should treat the Court as one institution10:
[W]hile Supreme Court justices certainly act in accordance with a set of
beliefs . . . it may be the case that the justices also believe that certain
kinds of attitudes—such as a decision to promote the well-being of political allies—would be an inappropriate or risky basis for decision-making, either because the exhibition of such attitudes violates a sense of
institutional propriety or because of a strategic calculation that the justices would have to pay too high a price for exhibiting these attitudes. .
. . [T]here is a second, and perhaps more important, reason why it is
essential for Supreme Court scholars to attend to institutional contexts
and not just judicial attitudes. Individuals who are associated with particular institutions often come to believe that their position imposes upon
them an obligation to act in accordance with particular expectations and
responsibilities.11
Still other political scientists continued to believe that law and precedent are relevant
to justices’ decisions, a principle the attitudinal model explicitly rejects. 12 Most notably,
Kritzer and Richards introduce a new theory to understand the relationship between legal
precedent, the facts of a case, and decision-making.13 They propose that courts treat the
law differently than elected bodies do, and that scholars must cease treating law as a
“mechanistic, autonomous force.”14 Instead, they propose that institutional norms impact

(2002) [hereinafter Richards & Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes].
6. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
7. Id.
8. SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 2-3 (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
9. Id. at 6.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Richards & Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes, supra note 5.
14. Id. at 305.
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decision-making through the mechanism of “jurisprudential regimes” (well-established legal doctrine or precedent in a particular area of law). 15 These regimes in turn structure
which facts of a case the Supreme Court will use in the decision-making process:
[B]y establishing which case factors are relevant for decision making
and/or by setting the level of scrutiny or balancing the justices are to
employ in assessing case factors . . . . Justices then apply regimes in
subsequent pertinent cases. After a new regime is established, we expect
case factors to matter to the justices in a manner distinct from their influence in cases decided prior to the establishment of the regime. 16
There is a large body of research building on Richards and Kritzer’s theory that law and
precedents are still relevant to Supreme Court decision-making.17 But, what is critical, is
that the attitudinal model remains the holy grail of decision-making models.
I would place the research at the heart of all three books under review in this essay
with other scholars who concede that the attitudinal model still stands at the heart of understanding the justices’ decisions, but who contend that, standing alone, the attitudinal
model does not fully explain Supreme Court decision-making. Two of the books, The Solicitor General and the U.S. Supreme Court: Executive Branch Influence and Judicial Decisions,18 and Oral Arguments and Coalition Formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: A
Deliberate Dialogue,19 add to our knowledge about strategic voting. Meanwhile, the third,
The Puzzle of Unanimity: Consensus on the United States Supreme Court,20 is a major
contribution to our knowledge about law’s independent role in Supreme Court decisionmaking.
Given that these books employ quantitative empirical research and statistical modeling, I was curious as to why these authors did not just publish their work in political
science journals. What ever happened to the adage regarding research in American Politics
generally and Public Law specifically—those who engage with quantitative methods publish articles in journals, those who do qualitative research largely write books? In all likelihood, the authors of these books would like to see their work disseminated to a wider
15. Id. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. I: FOUNDATIONS 58-80 (1991) (identifying “constitutional regimes”).
16. Richards & Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes, supra note 5, at 305-06.
17. See e.g., MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FOREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND
THE DECISIONS THAT JUSTICES MAKE (2008) (discussing how legal doctrines, and the norm of adherence to
precedent, impacts Supreme Court decision-making, in conjunction with policy preferences); Saul Brenner &
Marc Stier, Retesting Segal and Spaeth’s Stare Decisis Model, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1036 (1996); Richard A.
Brisbin Jr., Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth and the Function of Law in Supreme Court Decision Making, 40
AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 1104 (1996) (moderate justices follow the doctrine of stare decisis); Donald R. Songer &
Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The Impact of Justices’ Values on Supreme Court Decision Making,
40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1049 (1996); RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 19531993 (1994); but see Jeffrey R. Lax & Kelly T. Rader, Legal Constraints on Supreme Court Decision Making:
Do Jurisprudential Regimes Exist?, 72 J. POL. 273 (2010) (arguing that little evidence supports precedents affect
Supreme Court voting behavior).
18. RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS (2012).
19. RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, & JUSTIN WEDEKING, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND COALITION
FORMATION ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE (2012).
20. PAM CORLEY, AMY STEIGERWALT, & ARTEMUS WARD, THE PUZZLE OF UNANIMITY: CONSENSUS ON
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2013).
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audience than they would otherwise gain from publication in a single journal, in which
articles tend to use quantitative methods either too complex, or simply not interesting, for
a broader audience.
Given the interdisciplinary focus of this volume, it seems that one important factor
must be accounted for before proceeding to a review of the book. Does the book explain
its quantitative methods in a manner that is accessible to a broader audience? In other
words, if only the “quants” can follow a book’s methods, models, and results, then it would
seem the appetite for these books would not extend beyond their core audience. Once the
authors are successful in achieving this goal of accessibility, they have an advantage over
other fields in American Politics, for the audience would now add not only qualitativeoriented political scientists and their graduate students, but legal scholars as well.
Furthermore, in assessing these empirically-driven books, as with any book, we want
to assess whether there is a “big” research question, a novel theory underlying the hypotheses, and empirical research that adequately tests their hypotheses. In other words, does it
contribute significantly to the extant research? While I found all three books successfully
explained their methods, results, and data in a manner accessible to a wider audience, the
books varied in terms of the degree by which they met the three determinants of a successful book.
In The Solicitor General and the United States Supreme Court, the authors pose the
question: do the Solicitor General (hereinafter “SG”) and his office (hereinafter “OSG”)
influence the Supreme Court more than other attorneys? 21 This is an important question,
but it is not the first time scholars have examined the relationship between the Court and
the OSG.22 The authors’ theory is that the OSG has a higher success rate than other litigants
because the Supreme Court justices view the attorneys in that office as “consummate professionals”23 and OSG “has built up a reputation as a truth-telling law firm.”24 Pursuant to
this theory, the OSG’s success arises from its relationship with the Court, and perhaps
more important, from the professionals it employs. 25 “By placing professionals in key positions – with the ability to take a long-term perspective – policy makers make a credible
commitment to broader goals of justice and efficiency. . . .”26 The support for this theory
comes from several aspects of the office’s duties. For example, the OSG will acquiesce to
certiorari, even when it prevailed at the Court of Appeals level, if it believes the question
presented should be answered definitively by the Court.27 The OSG also confesses error
when it believes that the grounds for lower federal court decision are erroneous.28 The
OSG screens cases for the Court, refusing to appeal cases it deems are based “on twisted
legal logic or issues that might significantly impair the Court’s legitimacy . . . .”29 In turn,
empirical evidence suggests that the less political the OSG appears, the more likely the
21. BLACK & OWENS, supra note 18.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 48 (whether or not the OSG is a “truth-telling law firm” is an empirical claim with no empirical
evidence to support it).
25. Id. at 32.
26. Id. at 91.
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id. at 20 n.17.
29. Id. at 33.
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Court will rely on its information.30
Acknowledging that previous scholars have attempted to unravel this puzzle, and
that their theory is not entirely novel, 31 the authors argue that such questions have never
been adequately tested before. What they really mean is that “matching methods” were
not used to analyze data. Matching methods balance the data between cases with the Solicitor General and those without, and allows the authors to gain greater purchase on how
the Court would have acted absent the SG.32 These quantitative-oriented scholars thus
maintain that their book is unique, not for their “professionalism” theory, but for the
“matching methods” they applied to newly collected data sets.33 Through use of these
matching methods, the authors contend that we will gain a more accurate understanding
of the relationship between OSG and the Court. By rejecting former theories about the
OSG-Court relationship, the authors are able to do just that.
Prior theories about the relationship between OSG and the Court include principalagent theory (in part, the professionalism theory, as the OSG as seen as an agent of the
Court),34 ideology (the SGs, like the justices, promote their own ideological preferences,
and the closer the arguments are to the median justice, the more likely the SG will prevail),35 attorney experience (repeat players have more success over one-time players),36
resource advantage (the government has significantly more resources than its opponent),37
quality of the attorney (the OSG hires the best and the brightest lawyers),38 a separation of
powers theory (the Court wants to avoid backlash from the elected branches),39 and biased
case selection (the OSG purposefully chooses to participate in cases that it knows it can
win).40
Chapters Four through Seven explore the various ways in which the OSG enjoys an
advantage over other attorneys. It should be noted that at each phase of the decision-making process, the authors find that judicial ideology is a statistically significant predictor of
the extent to which the OSG commands special treatment from the Court, consistent with
the attitudinal model.
In Chapter Four, the authors look at the certiorari process. Relying on Justice
Blackmun’s private papers, in which he recorded the votes of his fellow justices on the
decisions to grant certiorari, they find that the OSG has the most success in influencing
the agenda-setting stage of the process when its briefs are filed at the request of the Court,
rather than voluntarily. This is consistent with the professionalism theory, for it is in such
cases that the OSG is least likely to take a political position on the case. At the same time,
this evidence is inconsistent with the strategic selection theory, the attorney experience
30. Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Tenth Justice? Consequences of Politicization in the Solicitor General’s Office,
71 J. OF POL. 224 (2009).
31. REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 175 (1984).
32. BLACK & OWENS, supra note 18. I found the presentation of the results of the regression models with
matched data to be somewhat confusing, but after several readings, I eventually made sense of the post-estimate
analyses provided.
33. Id. at 32-34.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 40-42.
36. Id. at 34-35.
37. Id. at 35.
38. Id. at 39-40.
39. Id. at 42-44.
40. Id. at 44-45.
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theory, and separation of powers theory, allowing the authors to reject these prior theories
of SG influence.
In Chapter Five, the authors turn to the merits stage of a case and seek to establish
whether OSG wins more cases than a matched non-OSG lawyer. The authors match OSG
attorneys with those of equal experience, equal resources, the same amount of amici briefs,
and ideological distance from the Court’s median justice. They find that the SG wins more
often than other parties, all else being equal.
In Chapters Six and Seven, the book turns to an analysis of how often the OSG’s
written briefs and legal arguments find their way into the majority decision of the Court.
Not surprisingly, they again find the language used in the OSG’s briefs and the legal arguments promulgated therein are more likely to appear in a final decision of the Court than
that of non-OSG lawyers. Indeed, even when the OSG loses a case, the Court is more
likely to adopt their language than a winning non-OSG party.
These empirical chapters are strong, assuming one knows something about matching
techniques. Of the three books under review in this essay, this book’s presentation of the
results will be the most confusing to a broader audience. Many of the charts, for instance
those which demonstrate how much improvement the matched model has over an unmatched model, could have been placed in the appendix because they do not add to understanding the substantive results of the regression models. However, the methods are unique
compared to prior studies on the OSG, and the results are able to debunk the theories of
attorney experience, attorney quality, resource advantage, biased case selection, and the
separation of powers theories. In the end, none of the models enable them to reject the null
hypothesis concerning the theory of professionalism, which was the ultimate goal of the
book.
I would offer only one critique regarding the evidence presented in support of the
professionalism theory. In one of the models presented in the book, 41 depicted in Figure
5.2, the authors compare cases in which the SG himself argues a case and those in which
a Deputy SG appears before the Court. The results show that the actual SG wins cases
more than his deputies do. But, part of the professionalism theory is based on the fact that
three of the four Deputy SGs are not political appointees of the current presidential administration, as the SG is, but are career lawyers for the OSG. It is these individuals who
provide the OSG with the appearance of non-partisanship and who take a long-term view
of the cases in which they are involved. In other words, it is the career Deputy SG’s who
give the appearance of professionalism to the OSG. If this fact were true, then why do the
authors find that the SG is more likely to prevail in a case than a Deputy SG? It should be
the other way around if we are to buy in to the “professionalism” argument.
In the end, I would say that the research contained in the book will unlikely appeal
to a broader audience because of the somewhat complicated presentation of the matching
methods, but for those who have previous knowledge of matching methods, the book indeed contributes to our previous understanding about the relationship between the Court
and the OSG. The background research is well-done and the empirics flawless. But, as the
authors concede, the big question—why does the Court treat the OSG differently than

41. Id. at 85.
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other attorneys—remains elusive.
In Oral Arguments and Coalition Formation on the U.S. Supreme Court, the authors
ask: why do oral arguments matter?42 This body of research on oral arguments finds its
genesis in the work of Timothy Johnson, Paul Wahlbeck, and James F. Spriggs II.43 In
their ground-breaking article, they found that the quality of the oral argument (as measured
by Justice Blackmun in his private notes) influenced the outcome of a Supreme Court case.
Here again, building on the attitudinal model, their novel theory hypothesizes that oral
arguments, or more specifically, the questions posed to the attorneys as well as the “conversations” between justices during oral arguments, provide the justices with their first
pieces of evidence as to what their colleagues’ thinking is on the legal issue at hand. Theoretically, justices then use this information to begin forming coalitions that best reflect
their own personal policy preferences.
In Chapter Two, the authors flesh out their theory. They look to sociology scholarship about coalition formation and the importance of face-to-face conversations in that
process, and how initial interactions shape later debate.44 When justices ask questions to
an attorney, other justices can glean what the questioner’s likely policy preference is.
When they interrupt each other, they are really beginning a conversation among the justices. One interrupts another justice not only to learn about his position, but also to steer
the conversation in a different direction, hoping to set the agenda for like-minded justices
as well as the median justice. Oral arguments really begin a policy debate, and set the
contours of later debate and deliberation. They also allow justices an opportunity to surmise with whom they can ally, and what the other side’s arguments are. Justices may even
use questioning at the oral argument to predict the likely outcome of the case. Using a
database consisting of the text of all oral arguments during the 1998 through 2007 terms,
the authors can calculate descriptive statistics about interrupting behavior. Here, they look
for patterns of interruptions. Among other things, they find that interruptions occur about
eight times per oral argument, and that interruptions are most likely made by the most
ideologically distant justices from the speaker.
In Chapter Three the authors turn to listening patterns. What are these justices trying
to learn from oral argument? By calling upon the notes taken at oral argument by Justices
Powell and Blackmun, the authors gain much insight into how these justices approached
oral argument. They model the number of times each of these justices record notes about
the comments of their colleagues using negative binomial regression analysis, which takes
into account the fact that the dependent variable will always take on a positive value. 45
Their findings here are fascinating. Justice Blackmun’s notes reflect a justice on the liberal
end of the ideological continuum; his notes indicated he was interested in the opinions of
ideologically distant justices, presumably those whose arguments he must counterattack
in seeking to form a majority. Justice Powell’s notes reflect a median justice; he was taking
notes on others in the middle of the ideological spectrum, presumably those with whom
he can ally. Both, ultimately, reflect two justices concerned with coalition formation.

42. BLACK ET AL., supra note 19.
43. Timothy Johnson, Paul Wahlbeck, & James F. Spriggs II, The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 100 (2006).
44. BLACK ET AL., supra note 19, at 17-18.
45. Id. at 82-83.
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Chapter Four examines how oral arguments help the justices build road maps as to
who they believe will join their coalitions, and on what grounds they can find consensus,
taking mere listening to arguments to actual coalition formation. Here, however, the authors rely only on the notes of Justice Blackmun, taken at oral argument, who sometimes
reflected in his notes how he believed the votes would fall based on the questions being
posed, and arguments being made by the justices. Because there were three possible outcomes in this model (Blackmun makes no prediction, Blackmun makes correct prediction
or Blackmun makes incorrect prediction), the authors’ model simultaneously estimates,
first, the likelihood of whether or not Blackmun made a prediction regarding a particular
justice, and second, how accurate the prediction is. 46 The authors find a strong and positive
correlation between the frequency with which he records notes about a justice and first,
the likelihood of his making a prediction about the justice’s vote, and, second, the more
likely he is to predict the vote accurately.47
In sum, regarding this book, I find the empirical chapters thoroughly and clearly
explained, and the tables and figures easy to understand. In addition, I found the application of the sociology literature about conversations and decision-making to Supreme Court
decision-making to be a novel contribution to the literature. Finally, the book is a model
for future researchers who wish to use archival data in their scholarship.
My only critique of the book, a not insignificant one, is that the research suffers from
a generalizability problem. This is because, at this point in time, the authors can draw only
from the notes of two justices. We have no way of knowing whether Blackmun and Powell
represent all liberal and moderate justices, respectively. But, the evidence in the book
nonetheless gives us a unique insight into the strategic use of the oral arguments by Supreme Court justices. For that reason alone, I highly recommend this book.
In The Puzzle of Unanimity, the authors ask: why does the Supreme Court ever reach
unanimous consensus, given its members’ widely divergent ideological views?48 This is a
very timely book, as there seems to be much attention paid recently to this question. 49
And, as Liptak, Sunstein, and the authors all concur, there seem to be rampant misconceptions among the public about the impact of the Court’s great partisan divide.
Chapter One is an informative piece of legal history. From 1801 to approximately
1941, there was a clear norm of consensus, with dissents occurring rarely. Ninety percent
of cases were unanimous.50 Relying primarily on the papers of Chief Justice Harlan Stone
and Associate Justice William O. Douglas, the authors argue that the increase of dissenting
opinions was the product of historical developments outside the court coupled with institutional changes within the court in the late 1930s and 1940s.51 Chief Justice Stone’s per-

46. Id. at 95-96.
47. Id. at 105-06.
48. CORELY ET AL., supra note 20.
49. Adam Liptak, Justices Agree to Agree, at Least for the Moment, NY TIMES (May 27, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/us/supreme-court-issuing-more-unanimous-rulings; Cass Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court (Harv. Law. Sch., July 21, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2466057.
50. CORELY ET AL., supra note 20, at 14-48.
51. Id. at 14. These include the external developments the authors identify include the increased discretion
the justices had over their docket as a result of the Judges Bill of 1925, the rising importance of civil liberties
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sonal style, marked by confrontation, exacerbated this change in the Court’s norm of consensus. By the end of the Chief Justice Stone era (1941-1946), the norm was essentially
dead. Dissent rates climbed to forty-five percent of cases, and remain fairly stable to this
day.52 The authors call this metamorphosis the “dissensus revolution.” 53
Their most interesting finding involves the interaction of attitudes and legal certainty. As others have previously observed,54 the theory states:
[W]hen the level of legal certainty is high, and thus the level of certainty
about the strongest legal answer is greatest, the justices are constrained from
voting their attitudes. . . . [O]ur conceptualization suggests that unanimity
and consensus result in cases where the level of legal certainty is great.
However, when uncertainty exists as to which legal answer is strongest, dissensus is much more likely because this uncertainty enhances the justices’
ideological discretion.55
Their models to test this theory contain variables that consider not only law and
attitudes, but alternative explanations as well, including strategic considerations (including
whether the Chief Justice writes the unanimous decision),56 institutional constraints (such
as docket size and the number of law clerks available to each justice),57 and the presence
of certain case factors (such as the type of issue being litigated and the political salience
of the issue).58
Chapter Two provides an overview of the theory, and a summary of their quantitative data. Broadly, their theory is a combination of prior voting theories, including the
legal model, the attitudinal model, and the strategic model, along with institutional and
case-level characteristics. Their theory builds on prior research by Baum, Brandon, Kerr,
and Bartels,59 among others, who all argue that, under certain circumstances, law and precedent constrain the justices’ ability to decide cases based only on their policy preferences,
as the attitudinal model posits.
Here, the authors refine these other theories, and proffer that “legal certainty” acts
as a mediator between precedent and attitudes. Legal certainty is defined by a five-factor
index (cases involving a lack of legal complexity, amicus participation, legal conflict, legal
dissensus in the lower court, as well as statutory cases). 60 When legal certainty is high,

cases, and the influence of legal realism. The internal developments the authors identify include the increasingly
hostile nature of the justices’ conferences following oral argument, additional time between oral argument and
opinion hand-downs, and a more academic mind-set on the part of certain justices. Id. at 29-31.
52. Id. at 97.
53. Id. at 47.
54. Id. at 66.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 110-11.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 66 (1997); Brandon Bartels, The Constraining
Capacity of Legal Doctrine on the U.S. Supreme Court, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 474 (2009); Orin Kerr, Legal
Ambiguity, Empathy and the Role of Judicial Power, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2009, 5:51 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1242251518.shtml.
60. BAUM, supra note 59, at 62-76.
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personal policy preferences are constrained; when legal certainty is low, the justices proceed to vote based on their personal policy preferences. According to their theory, “even
the most ideologically polarized Court finds agreement in cases in which the available
information strongly points to a single legal answer.” 61 To elucidate their theory, the authors turn to a metaphor of the “jaws of a vise”:
If the jaws are sufficiently tight, the object does not fit through or does
so only such that the vise subsequently shapes it. However, when the
jaws are open the object passes through unimpeded and in its original
form. In terms of judicial decision making, we view the object as the
justices’ attitudes and the vise as the law. 62
The authors, thus, see the law as having an indirect effect on the justices’ decisions.
As they posit: “[A]ttitudes are the principal force but [] they can be constrained by legal
forces in certain cases.”63
Chapters Three and Four comprise the critical empirical testing of the book. Examining all Supreme Court cases from the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts (1954-2004
terms), the authors do, in fact, find that a combination of the law, strategy, and ideology
explain why the justices vote unanimously, and adopt unanimous opinions, in some cases
but not others.
The Puzzle of Unanimity is a well-written book. Its methods are clear and easily
accessible to a wide audience, and the authors’ findings contribute significantly to prior
studies on Supreme Court decision-making. Unlike the other two books, the authors provide strong and generalizable evidence consistent with their theory. For me, one of the
main contributions of the book is the authors’ operationalization of the concept of legal
certainty through the creation of a five-factor index. Future research on Supreme Court
decision-making will surely incorporate this metric. My only critique of the book is that,
in several places the authors suggest that a unanimous decision is seen as more legitimate
than a divided decision. In fact, what little evidence there is on this legitimacy claim refutes
the proposition.64

61. CORLEY ET AL., supra note 20, at 111.
62. Id. at 66.
63. Id. at 109.
64. See Michael F. Salamone, Supreme Court Unity and Public Opinion: An Experimental Study (APSA
Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450847; Michael F. Salamone, Judicial
Consensus and Public Opinion: Conditional Response to Supreme Court Majority Size, 67 POL. RES. Q. 320
(2014); see also Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1 (claiming that “arguments in favor of higher levels of consensus .
. . rest on fragile empirical foundations”).
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